3 measures; that is, decomposing the change in nominal spending into changes attributable to things getting more expensive (inflation) vs changes in the quantity and quality of goods and services provided (growth in real output). In national statistics, this decomposition can be done either indirectly by using price indexes to deflate the growth in nominal output or directly by constructing volume indexes.
Valuing non-market activities-such as health care provided for free by the government-is difficult because there are no transaction prices with which to apply the usual methods. Thus, the universal practice in the countries under study is to value these activities at cost-using price indexes to calculate changes in the cost of providing inputs to treatments for conditions. As noted in Steve Landefeld's discussion of this paper (at the time of the conference, Landefeld was Director of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis), valuing these activities at cost implicitly assumes zero productivity gains in providing treatments, which in turn assumes away the possibility that innovations might allow more treatments to be provided at the same cost or the same treatments at a lower cost.
With regard to splitting out changes in spending into price and volume components, several issues arise. First, the authors note that one would, ideally, want to measure the complete path of treatments for a medical condition or episode of care. Doing so would properly account for shifts in treatment protocols that affect cost: for example, shifts from talk therapy to (lower cost) drug therapy in the treatment of depression. However, the organization of the available data accounts does not allow one to measure care using this definition. In particular, in the administrative data that is typically available, treatments at different venues (hospital, residential care, etc.) are reported separately and do not allow one to tie all of the spending to specific patients. For that reason, virtually all of the OECD countries use price or volume indexes for the 4 individual treatments. However, as noted by Schreyer and Mas, there is increasing interest in using disease-based price indexes that tie expenditures and activities to specific medical conditions. Construction of such disease-based treatment price indexes is becoming feasible in part because of the increasing availability of government and private sector medical claims data.
The increasingly available health care claims and outcomes data in electronic format covering millions of lives raises issues of how best to exploit such data statistically. One major problem with many of these observational claims data is that they are not generated from randomization, i.e. treatments and non-treatments are not randomly assigned to patients, but instead reflect the decisions of physicians, patients and payers resulting in data subject to selection biases. This is in contrast to experimental data emanating from randomized controlled trials, or from quasi-randomized data plausibly linked to a quasi-randomized data generating process. Can one use sophisticated statistical methods, such as propensity score procedures, with observational data to generate reliable estimates of causality that inform cost-effectiveness analyses? That is the focus of the second chapter in this section by Armando Franco of the Franco and colleagues start by noting the broad popularity of comparative effectiveness research. This research, which typically compares one drug to another, is generally based on randomized trials. However, randomized trials are expensive, often underpowered to detect rare outcomes, and typically focused on a homogeneous group of patients. Thus, it is natural to wonder if claims data can substitute for randomized trials. 5 Franco and colleagues use data from 2006 to 2009 for Medicare Parts A, B, and D to examine these issues. The specific drug class they consider is angiotension II receptor blockers (ARBs), which are used to treat hypertension. The FDA has identified stroke and cancer as possible unintended consequences of using ARBs. They examine whether claims data confirm these results.
Even a cursory examination of claims data highlights the significant difficulties in comparative effectiveness research they entail. Some people discontinue treatment, while others switch from one treatment to another. Neither of these decisions is random. The paper considers two methods to control for non-random selection of people into treatments. First, they assume that physicians have a preferred drug to prescribe, and patients do not choose physicians on the basis of this unobserved propensity. Thus, they compare the outcomes for physicians that prescribe ARBs more frequently compared to physicians that prescribe them less frequently. Second, they instrument for the patient's choice of an ARB using the relative price of ARBs in comparison to other hypertension treatments. If patients do not choose plans on the basis of these price differences, this instrument can serve to randomize treatment to individuals.
Using each of these strategies, the authors find mixed evidence that ARBs lead to higher cancer rates, and some evidence that ARBs lead to higher stroke rates than other antihypertension medications. However, other signs are troubling. Use of ARBs presumed to be exogenous is associated with greater reports of pain. Since neither ARBs nor other antihypertensive medications would affect pain, these results suggest non-random assignment of people to treatments, even with the two methodologies. Overall, their conclusion is cautious in some parts, and optimistic in others. 6 Traditional measures of inflation and productivity published by government statistical agencies aim to provide metrics for the sector as a whole at the macro level. Recently, the arrival of new datasets and development of new methods have allowed further study into the methods underlying the official statistics, how they might be disaggregated from aggregate sectoral to disease-specific treatment metrics, and how those measures might be improved.
The final two chapters in this section provide examples of the kinds of decompositions that can be done using official statistics and discuss the potential frailties in the data and methods. Both papers exploit patient-centric data that allow them to define the treatment of diseases over the complete course of treatment. Specifically, both sets of authors generate indexes called Medical Care Expenditure indexes (MCEs) that allow one to decompose changes in expenditures into changes in price vs. changes in quantity. Notably, because these indexes do not account for changes in the quality of treatment (or patient outcomes), a National Academies Panel recommended using the label "medical care expenditure" indexes instead of price indexand that is what both these papers do.
The study by Abe Dunn of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eli Liebman of Duke and Adam Shapiro of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco develops a decomposition of changes in medical care spending and applies that decomposition to a health claims database for commercially-insured patients. Their decomposition first breaks out changes in spending into two components: changes in per capita treated prevalence of disease and changes in the MCE index-that tracks changes in the cost of episodes of care. They then further break out changes in the MCE into changes in procedure prices-by constructing a procedure price index-and changes in utilization of procedures. In their analyses, episodes of care are measured using an episode grouping algorithm that uses the diagnoses reported in the claims data to allocate 7 spending into individual disease categories. The ability to drill down to the procedure level is made possible by their dataset, which is highly granular, and reports spending and diagnosis information for each procedure. As with many papers in the recent literature, given the complexity of the task, no attempt is made to account for changes in quality of care or patient outcomes.
Overall, Dunn, Liebman and Shapiro report that both prevalence and the cost of treating conditions contributed to the growth in spending from 2003 to 2007. Further breaking out the latter, they find that most of the growth in the MCEs comes from growth in the procedure price index; there is very little change in their index of the utilization of procedures. Given the similarity in their procedure price index and the official price indexes, their finding suggests no obvious bias in the official price indexes for health care spending. Although reassuring, as the authors note, their finding is not definitive owing to differences in the composition of patients in their data-only fee for service patients with commercial insurance and drug coverage-and the broader coverage of the official statistics-that include Medicare patients, for example.
Using the five top spending categories, Dunn, Liebman and Shapiro show that their finding of little change in the utilization of procedures is the net effect of two shifts that held down costs--shifts from inpatient to outpatient care and a shift from branded drugs to generic drugs-and a shift that works in the other direction--an increase in the utilization of procedures at physicians' offices.
The study by Anne Hall and Tina Highfill of the Bureau of Economic Analysis also focuses on MCE indexes. In particular, Hall and Highfill study the numerical importance for these indexes of different methods for allocating spending by disease-alternatives to the episode grouper used in Dunn et al-and different datasets-surveys vs. claims. They consider 8 two methods for allocating spending to disease categories: (1) the principal diagnosis method, which allocates all spending from an encounter to the first-listed diagnosis, and (2) a regression method, which scrolls up the encounter-level data to the patient level and uses fixed effects to indicate the conditions for which the patient was treated that year. They apply these methods to two different datasets that contain patient-centric data for Medicare beneficiaries: the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the survey and claims components of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).
Hall and Highfill find that when the different methods are applied to the same datasets, the primary diagnosis method produces higher average annual aggregate growth rates. They conclude the regression-based method should be employed with caution, given its sensitivity to outliers and propensity for producing volatile indexes. Regarding the different datasets, the MEPS is the only dataset with diagnoses attached to drug events, which significantly affects the resulting indexes. On balance, however, the MCBS is probably the preferable dataset for Medicare beneficiaries because of its greater sample size and its inclusion of nursing home residents. The optimal index may be a hybrid of the primary diagnosis method applied to Medicare claims and a regression-based index for pharmaceutical spending.
II. Analyses of Sub-populations and Market Segments
An alternative approach to disease-based measurement aggregated over all providers is to instead focus on costs and outcomes in a particular health care delivery sub-market, such as hospitals or physicians. Harvard looks at decomposition methods using a large commercially insured population.
Rosen and colleagues consider three ways of partitioning medical spending to conditions.
The first approach, which is typical in much of the literature, involves assigning each medical care claim to one or more diseases. For example, a visit to a primary care doctor that is coded as being for high cholesterol would be classified as spending for that condition. The difficulty with this approach is that many people have comorbid medical conditions. The claims based approach requires that physicians adequately solve the comorbidity problem -what factor is really contributing to the patient needing care? In practice, such an attribution is difficult to make, and may not even be possible for patients with particularly complex illnesses. The second approach is a regression approach. In this method, total spending for the year is regressed on the full set of conditions that a patient has. The resulting coefficients are used to back out spending for each condition. In practice, however, the regression approach is only as good as the underlying model of spending, which is itself problematic in a number of ways.
The third approach, which is developed by the authors in the chapter, is to use a propensity score methodology to cost diseases. The idea is to find people with a particular condition and compare their spending to a group of people who are otherwise similar but without the condition in question. The resulting spending difference is an estimate of the cost of treating that condition.
The data that Rosen and colleagues employ is from the Marketscan database, which has 2.3 million people under age 65 with both medical and pharmaceutical coverage. The authors note that the method chosen to allocate spending has a material impact on the findings. Broadly speaking, the claims-based approaches allocate more spending to acute conditions -a heart 11 attack for example -while the regression and propensity score approaches attribute some of that spending to comorbid conditions such as musculoskeletal problems and mental illness. In addition, the authors show significant problems with the claims method, where not all spending has a condition associated with it (for example, prescription drugs). Without a gold standard to which to compare, the authors do not choose a favorite methodology. They suggest that researchers should be very careful about methodology. there is an increasing marginal disutility (i.e., hunger) of non-satiation. In summary, in the ex ante period, both insurance status and BMI are determined. If the individual purchases insurance, the financial consequences of illness are less severe, and the policy holder is not compensated by the plan for the savings generated by suffering additional disutility to get the BMI nearer to an ideal level -thereby generating ex ante moral hazard.
Likewise, employer sponsored insurance premia do not appear to be risk adjusted for increases in BMI. As BMI increases, so does the risk of severe disease. This increases the expected utility of having health insurance, yielding adverse selection.
After having estimated the ex post cost equation, Bradley-Baker undertake several simulations. Of particular interest is a simulation of a 10% BMI reduction for all obese persons on costs. Bradley-Baker report a $45 per capita annual cost reduction were all obese people to reduce their BMI by 10% --a rather modest amount. They conclude that while high BMI does increase costs, policies that are successful in reducing BMI will not generate the large cost savings previously estimated by other researchers. They conjecture that current intervention 15 programs to reduce obesity may underestimate the marginal disutility that obese individuals experience when they reduce an additional BMI.
III. Prescription Pharmaceutical Markets
Pharmaceutical markets present an important case for measuring and modeling health spending. Pharmaceuticals themselves account for more than 10% of medical spending. In addition, though, there are changes in the form of delivery and producer of the good (e.g., branded v. generic) that need to be accounted for. Indeed, the classic example of health price index adjustments that are thought to be essential is the lower price that results from substituting generic medications for branded ones. Despite the importance of pharmaceuticals in understanding medical care costs and prices, there has been relatively little work taking a close look at the pharmaceutical sector. The next section of this volume remedies this deficiency. 
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Their analysis reaches several conclusions. First, the major trends that occur with loss of exclusivity are on the price side. Many patients switch to generic versions of medications. This switch, at relative constant prices, lowers spending significantly. Because generics are less expensive than branded drugs, the total quantity of drugs consumed rises. Second, offsetting some of the lower spending from substitution is the fact that branded drug prices continue to raise prices after generics enter. The authors rationalize this as a result of an increasingly inelastic purchasing pool when price sensitive consumers have shifted to generic formulations, leaving brand-loyal consumers vulnerable to brand price increases.
Generic penetration rates differ across patient groups. They are generally highest for third party payers and lowest for Medicaid. Correspondingly, cash payers and seniors generally pay the highest prices for brands and generics, while third party payers (and those under age 65) pay the lowest prices. It is likely that third party payers can steer more patients to less expensive formulations, and they use this power to extract lower prices from pharmaceutical companies.
Finally, they explore the impact of an 'authorized generic' during the 180-day exclusivity period -a molecule which has been authorized as an official generic version, and has a 180-day exclusivity period as a generic drug. They find that having an authorized generic has a significant impact on prices and volume of prescriptions, but this varies across molecules. In two of the cases studied, the brand and its licensee collectively retained almost two-thirds share of the market by volume, in the others they captured less than half. Price discounts off the brand prevailing during the "triopoly" period (the period with a branded medication and a two authorized generic medications) also showed substantial variation. In some cases, the price of the authorized generic product was between the brand and the independent generic, in others it was 17 significantly below the independent generic. All told, these dynamics have important implications for price and quantity of pharmaceuticals.
A particularly important pharmaceutical market is for so-called 'specialty drugs' -drugs which are administered by physicians to patients through a non-oral route (e.g., injected, infused or inhaled) or taken directly by patients after requiring very exacting production processes.
Many drugs with prices exceeding $10,000 per annual treatment are specialty drugs, whose prices have become controversial. Insulin is a classic example of a specialty drug. On the supply side, because of the difficulty of production, there are often few suppliers of any particular medication. As a result, shortages can (and do) occur.
Rena Conti of the University of Chicago and Ernst Berndt of MIT examine how the loss of patent exclusivity affects the prices and utilization of specialty drugs. To do this, they utilize a unique set of information on drug prices and sales from IMS health. They focus on cancer medications because specialty drugs are particularly important for the treatment of cancer and the side effects associated with their use.
Loss of patent exclusivity allows generic firms to enter a market; Conti and Berndt show that they do so. After a patent expires, between two and five generic firms enter the market.
However, true competition is somewhat lower than this, since many of the drugs are made by the same company and marketed by different intermediaries. Thus, the manufacturer likely has more market power than it appears.
Even so, loss of exclusivity results in significant generic price declines. Conti and Berndt estimate that generic drug prices fall by 25-50 percent after exclusivity is lost. Administration's AB-rating of generic drugs, generic versions are not only essentially perfectly substitutable with the same-molecule brand, but also with each other. While both quality/purity of product and reliability of supply are costly attributes for the manufacturer to provide, they are generally invisible to buyers and patients. In non-pharmaceutical markets where the quality/purity and reliability of supply attributes are observable, a premium is paid for them. An important consequence of this institutionalized substitutability among generic drugs is that when competition takes the form of near-Bertrand auctions where suppliers are asked to meet or beat the price of the competition to win a supply contract, the firms surviving the intense price competition with any sort of profit margin will need to implement relentless cost-cutting. Given that many dominant modern generic manufacturers are multi-product firms with dozens if not hundreds of products on the market at any one time, once price competition has had its relentless effect on prices for more mature generic products, revenues and profits for individual products may not make a large contribution to the bottom line of the company. As a result, when faced with supply disruptions of any magnitude on older mature low-margin products, generic manufacturers may not find it worthwhile to address manufacturing quality issues, instead reducing their investments in maintenance and product quality. The nature of market competition in U.S. generic pharmaceutical markets thus leads to a "race to the bottom" in both 20 price and quality. If the current costs of plant maintenance and product quality investment exceed the discounted expected value of lost profits due to a shutdown, then the investments are not worth undertaking. Note that this market competition affects both injectable and noninjectable drugs.
Regulatory actions regarding quality/purity monitoring are a second potential broad cause of shortages. In particular, in a market where product quality is not generally observable but the actions of the regulator are, the FDA's actions may play an important role in setting expectations for both buyers and sellers. The profit-maximizing decisions of producers may be to undertake only those expenses required to pass the FDA's threshold and no more -leading to a generally consistent low level of quality. Were product quality an observable attribute, manufacturers might find it optimal to differentiate themselves by optimizing around different levels of observable quality. Manufacturers facing the uncertainty of whether they will be subject to an FDA inspection may well pick a level of quality that is below the public regulatory threshold if the probability of future inspection is less than one. Manufacturers may assign different probabilities to the possibility of detection, and/or may be risk averse to varying degrees, which could lead them to choose heterogeneous levels of quality. To the extent such heterogeneity exists and it translates into differences in marginal production costs, an adverse selection problem could arise. With Bertrand-like competition, the producers most likely to survive in the market are those that are most willing to take a risk with low spending on quality, giving them a low marginal cost and an advantage in price competition. Moreover, even if the relatively riskloving low-cost firms were eventually inspected and shut down, the consequences could be longlasting if they have already edged out high quality competition, leaving no alternative higherquality supply available. Thus, in Stomberg's scenarios, a key ingredient is the FDA's setting 21 clear expectations and time-consistent quality monitoring policies. If the FDA sets expectations both about the probability of inspection and the quality threshold in one time period, but then changes one or the other of these subsequently, it could potentially cause either disruption or time-inconsistent issues. Stomberg conjectures that altered FDA inspection rates, to the extent they reflect exogenous regime changes, are a plausible factor that could contribute to increased
shortage rates (at least in the short run), and this would be an effect likely to cut across both injectable and non-injectable drugs. Later in the chapter Stomberg analyzes this possibility empirically.
The third broad possible cause of shortages put forward by Stomberg is limited price responsiveness on both the demand and supply side, at least in the short run. FDA regulatory activity in drug quality inspections and citations and the incidence of new drug shortages, with the relationship being similar across both injectable and non-injectable drugs. He concludes that changes in regulatory activity may be one of the cross-cutting factors contributing to the ongoing wave of drug shortages, and that supply interruptions resulting from changes in regulatory activity can be viewed as a necessary step on the road to a different quality equilibrium. He cautions, however, that the predictive power of his empirical model is modest, leaving a substantial amount of variation in new drug shortage starts remaining unexplained by the regulatory activity factor. Pricing and market structure (such as changes in the number of generic manufacturers for a molecule due to mergers and acquisitions) could be additional important factors to consider in future research on drug shortages.
IV. Issues in Industrial Organization and Market Design
Many of the previous chapters refer to issues of how the industrial organization (IO) of medical care affects costs and outcomes. Several of the papers address this topic directly.
Laurence Baker and Kate Bundorf of Stanford University, along with Anne Royalty of Indiana University, start with a central issue in physician markets: how to measure the concentration of physician ownership.
As Baker, Bundorf, and Royalty note, measuring concentration is important for several reasons. In the hospital industry, hospitals with greater market shares have higher prices for both inpatient and outpatient care. Some data suggest that this is true for physicians as well, although measures of physician concentration are scarce. Concentration may also influence quality, with some authors suggesting that more concentrated markets have higher quality, and others suggesting lower quality.
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Measuring physician concentration is difficult because ownership patterns are difficult to follow. A small physician practice may be owned by a larger group, which itself might be owned by a big health system. Is the physician practice small, or part of a large system? Baker, Bundorf, and Royalty propose to use Medicare data to measure concentration. Specifically, they investigate the use of Tax Identification Numbers (TINs) to measure physician firms. The TIN is the organization that receives the payment from Medicare for physician services. For a measure of financial integration (their aim), this is a natural measure of concentration.
Baker, Bundorf, and Royalty use the TINs to characterize physician practices in the period 1998-2010. They reach several conclusions. First, they conclude that TINs provide a reasonable way to group practices. They tend to be consistent over time and identify groups of physicians that are known to be large. Second, many physician markets are highly concentrated.
For many specialties in many areas, physician HHI indices are well above 2,500, the standard measure that triggers antitrust worry. Third, these concentration measures have been increasing over time. The increase is particularly pronounced in areas such as surgeries, while concentration has fallen over time in some medical specialties. Fourth, they do not find a large advantage to incorporating data on ownership of physicians by hospitals or other systems. Most physicians still practice independent of institutional providers. Finally, they note that other data will need to be added to Medicare claims, since data on pediatricians, obstetricians, and some other specialists are not always prevalent in Medicare data. Even still, they conclude that they have identified a promising way to measure market concentration.
A particularly important market in which to analyze competition is the health insurance market. Many countries rely on insurance market competition to promote high quality, low cost access to medical care. For example, the Affordable Care Act in the United States provides 24 subsidies to individuals to purchase insurance in state-based insurance exchanges. Medicare also has a private insurance option, as do national health care systems in the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and other countries.
Competition in health insurance is different from competition in other markets, however.
In most markets, the cost of serving people is independent of who buys the product; the cost of producing a pill, for example, depends only on manufacturing and distribution costs, not how sick the patient is. In health insurance, that is not the case. Insurers that attract less healthy enrollees will have higher costs than those that attract healthier enrollees, even with the same coverage network and prices paid.
For this reason, payments to health plans in choice-based system are often 'risk-adjusted'.
The goal behind risk adjustment is to pay more for less healthy enrollees, so that such individuals do not raise the price to all enrollees. Typical risk adjustment formulae base payments on demographics along with clinical conditions. Jacob Glazer of Tel Aviv, along with Tom McGuire and Julie Shih of Harvard University explore optimal risk adjustment in their paper. Glazer, McGuire, and Shih begin by noting a fundamental anomaly with risk adjustment based on conditions. The procedures used for risk adjustment make the weights used a function of the data on enrollees, but the enrollees are a function of the risk adjustment formula. Thus, the formula builds in adverse selection.
The question that Glazer, McGuire, and Shih ask is how to account for this adverse selection in designing risk adjustment formulae. Their analysis has both a theoretical and an empirical component. Theoretically, they design the optimal second best risk adjustment formula -second best because there is always sorting based on the risk adjustment formula itself.
They show that optimal risk adjustment can be determined by constrained regression, where the 25 constraints (on the risk adjustment weights) require that risk adjustment transfer sufficient funds to the premium group to achieve the desired subsidy in equilibrium. Intuitively, the second best risk adjustment trades off several features, including the degree of adverse selection, which itself is based on peoples' (possibly incorrect) forecasts of their own future spending.
Empirically, they use data from seven years of the Medical Expenditure Panel Study (MEPS) to estimate the optimal risk adjustment formula. The sample is selected to be representative of people in the insurance exchanges. They consider choices between a typical
Gold and Silver plan, using data on spending to sort people to plans. Not surprisingly, the market fares poorly when there is no risk adjustment; the Gold plan attracts sick people, and the Silver plan enrolls healthy people. Conventional risk adjustment improves the situation significantly. But the optimal risk adjustment is even better. Glazer, McGuire, and Shih show that the optimal risk adjustment formula has significantly lower welfare cost than the conventional risk adjustment. They also show how to incorporate other constraints on pricing that may be desired, for example limiting cost differentials between older and younger people.
Rather than focusing on risk adjustment characteristics of aspects of the Affordable Care
Act ( What will be the effects of these and other provisions of the ACA legislation? To answer such important questions (and undoubtedly, there will be differences of opinion), it will be necessary to establish a pre-ACA, or at least a pre-ACA implementation baseline of data, from which to compare post-ACA changes. In this chapter, Karaca-Mandic and her coauthors discuss challenges in describing and measuring the size, structure, and performance of the individual and small group markets. Along the way they discuss improvements in data availability beginning in 2010 that could in principle address some of these issues. Finally, using data from the National Regarding the structure of the individual and small group markets for health insurance, an obvious issue is whether these markets are "competitive" and how market structure interacts with premiums/prices. In this context, the authors document very substantial heterogeneity in market competition across states and regions. Counting the number of competitors in a state is not a trivial issue, for health insurance is sold by life insurance firms, fraternal, and property/casualty insurers, as well as by health insurance firms. The authors report on data from "credible" firms, defined as having a minimum number of member years (e.g., at least 1000 in 2010 and 2011). 
V. Potpourri
The two final chapters in this volume deal with somewhat different topics than those presented by the author conference participants. Nonetheless, they are equally important in addressing these issues. Didem Bernard and Thomas Selden of the Agency for Health Care
Research and Quality (AHRQ), and and Yuriy Pylypchuk of Social and Scientific Systems, Inc., examine the total amount of public spending on medical care and its 'benefit incidence' in 2010.
That year was important in part because it laid the foundation for modeling of the Affordable Care Act. And the effort here is particularly important in supporting the modeling that AHRQ and other agencies do to understand the likely impact of health care reforms.
The data that are used are primarily from the Medical Expenditure Panel Study.
However, the MEPS is known to understate certain categories of spending and certain categories of people (for example, high spenders). Thus, the first challenge for the research is to adjust MEPS spending to national totals. The authors follow previous methodology that they and others developed to do this. In addition, the authors use data from the NBER's TAXSIM model to attribute tax expenditures to relevant groups.
The results show large amounts of government spending for medical care, directed primarily at the elderly. For example, total government spending on medical care is 31 approximately three times higher for the elderly than the adult population, and five times higher for the elderly than for children. Much of this spending is for the very poor, but not all of it.
Medicaid benefits are predominately for the poor, but tax expenditures for employer-provided health insurance reach much higher up in the income distribution -both because higher income people are more likely to have employer-provided insurance and because the value of the tax exclusion is higher at higher incomes. Because medical costs have increased over time, the value of this spending has risen as well.
One of the fundamental issues in the measurement of health costs is determining how such costs relate to health benefits. Nominal prices count only what is spent. Real prices -and corresponding real output -require a quality adjustment. Frank Lichtenberg of Columbia University explores a novel way to measure the health benefits of medical innovation.
Lichtenberg's methodology is to measure how much medical knowledge is learned about diseases, measured as the number of publications referring to the disease. He then relates this to mortality reductions for the disease.
The clinical setting Lichtenberg considers is cancer. Cancer is natural to study because there are about 45 well-identified sites, the National Cancer Institute calculates consistent Lichtenberg shows a clear relationship between recent research findings and mortality declines. The number of articles published in the last 5-10 years has a large and significant effect in lowering mortality. The effects are such that many cancers with declining mortality would have increasing mortality were it not for new research findings.
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Taken together, the papers in this volume present a compelling case that we have made significant advances in understanding the cost of medical care, and that we can continue to make such improvements in the future. Current and future analyses will have much to learn from the studies reported here.
